Description

SECURE TRANSACTIONS WITH
PASSIVE STORAGE MEDIA

5

TECHNICAL FIELD

The present invention relates to passive data storage media, such as optical memory cards, and transaction systems making use of such media, and in

10 particular relates to measures taken to ensure secure transactions.

BACKGROUND ART

In U.S. Patent No. 5,694,471, Chen et al.

15 disclose a system for preventing fraudulent use of identity or transaction cards. The cards are chip cards that include an integrated circuit with a unique serial number permanently and unalterably burned into the chip, and having sufficient storage capacity for a card issuer

20 identification (ID) number, user information (name, account number, signature image, etc.), the public key of a public-private key pair, a digital signature, and a personal identification number (PIN) derived from a user password. To initialize a card, a one-way hash function

25 is performed on the issuer ID and user information to obtain a checksum, an XOR operation is performed on the checksum and card serial number to obtain a composite result, and this result is enciphered using the private key of the public-private key pair to obtain the digital

30 signature. Also, the PIN is obtained by enciphering the card serial number using a user-entered password as the key. In carrying out a transaction at a processing terminal, a card is authenticated by deciphering its digital signature using its public key to recover the

35 composite result, performing an XOR operation on the composite result and card serial number to recover the checksum, performing a one-way hash function on the issuer ID and user information to compute a checksum and

comparing the recovered and computed checksums, which should match if the card is authentic. The user is authenticated by enciphering the card serial number using a user-entered password as the key to compute a PIN and

5 then comparing it with the stored PIN on the card to determine whether they match.

In U.S. Patent No. 5,999,626, Mullin et al. disclose a digital signature scheme for a smart card in which signature components for a transaction session are

10 generated partly by the processing chip on the card and partly by the associated transaction terminal. In particular, a signature composed of a pair of elements is generated for a session by combining another pair of elements selected from a set of prestored signing

15 elements on the card, with the initial step in the computation being performed by the processing chip on the card and the result thereof transferred to the transaction device for the additional steps in the derivation. Thus, the identity of the signing elements

20 prestored on the card is not revealed to the transaction terminal, but the bulk of the computation is implemented by the terminal instead of by the processing chip on the card.

These examples illustrate some of the ways in

25 which secure transactions may be carried out when using a smart card, which has an embedded microprocessor chip in it. Thus, a smart card can encrypt and decrypt data (or share part of the computation with another device), that is saved internally in its memory.

30 In contrast, passive storage media, such as optical memory cards (OMCs), memory chip cards, compact disks (CD-R and CD-RW), or magnetic media, don't have a microprocessor chip. While they have large memory capacity useful for storing complete transaction records,

35 they have not been deemed sufficiently secure for transaction applications like e-commerce. Any transaction system involving passive media will, like those involving smart cards, require card and user

authentication protocols, and also will certainly need to have its stored transaction data be encrypted. Some computers already have encryption and protocol control processors inside the hardware, and some IC-chip readers

5   already have some protocol control processors inside them. But in a system using passive storage media, software/firmware protocols and encryption of the data stored on the media will not be enough to ensure adequate security. Other system security components will be

10   needed to prevent interception of decrypted data at any weak link in the transaction system and access to the encryption/decryption keys will need to be denied to all but authorized persons. To date, such security measures have been unavailable to systems that use passive storage

15   media and, thus, in comparison to smart cards. The passive media systems have been deemed too insecure for those transactions which are vulnerable to fraud or forgery (e.g., financial transactions).

It is an object of the present invention to

20   provide data security methods and systems for achieving secure transactions when using passive storage media, such as optical memory cards.

It is another object of the present invention to provide both hardware and software/firmware security

25   measures to deny unauthorized access to cryptographic keys and to prevent interception of decrypted data streams.

DISCLOSURE OF THE INVENTION

30   These objects have been met by a transaction system that secures the read/write drive for the passive medium and the drive-host communications link from unauthorized access to the cryptographic keys and decrypted transaction data. The drive provides the

35   encryption and decryption processing for the medium (since the medium lacks an embedded processor chip), provides authentication of users presenting a passive medium for a transaction, and is tamper resistant to

thwart attempts to gain access to the cryptographic keys. Further, the drive's communication link with a host computer is also conducted using only encrypted data and secure protocols, so that no decrypted data stream is available for interception at any point in the system and only authorized communications will be recognized by the system. Only the host computer can extract or decrypt messages (commands and data) received from a drive.

Validation of a user is performed through a combination of a digital signature derived from a user-entered keyword or personal identification number (PIN) and digital certificates used by a trusted certificate authority. Each passive storage medium and each drive may have several unique keys and certificates, e.g. for different partitions or sections of the medium and for different operations or types of transactions to be mediated by the drive.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Fig. 1 is a schematic plan view of a hardware architecture for a transaction system in accord with the present invention.

Fig. 2 is a tree diagram illustrating a digital certificate hierarchy issuing certificates used by the transaction system of the present invention.

Fig. 3 is a flow diagram for enrolling a user of the transaction system.

Fig. 4 is a flow diagram for verifying the identity of an enrolled user of the transaction system.

Fig. 5 is a flow diagram for changing keys used by a drive of the transaction system.

Fig. 6 is a flow diagram for storage of secure data.

BEST MODE FOR CARRYING OUT THE INVENTION

With reference to Fig. 1, a transaction system of the present invention includes a drive 10 for reading data from and writing data to a passive storage medium

12, such as a optical memory card, and a host computer 14 in data communication with the drive 10 via a communications link 36, which may be part of a network. Optical memory cards are cards, about the size of a

5   credit card (e.g. 54 X 86mm), on which is disposed an optically readable storage medium 16 storing data. The data can include analog data (watermarks, holograms, etc.) or digital data (barcodes, spots 17 formed in tracks, etc.) or both. These data contain information

10   related both to transaction data (messages) and information related to the security of the messages (keys and certificates). Optical memory cards that store digital data can be read by an optical reader writer which uses a laser diode, photodetector plus some

15   scanning optics, represented figuratively by the element 18 and light 20. Motors 22 move the card 12 and position it appropriately relative to the light 20. Such optical read/write devices for optical memory cards are well known. The solutions realized by the present invention

20   are applicable not only to optical cards, but also any other passive storage medium (i.e., a medium lacking an embedded microprocessor), such as magnetic and optical disks (CD-ROM, CD-R, CD-RW), magnetic memory storage devices (computer hard drives) and microprocessor-less

25   IC-chip cards, together with the corresponding drives that drive them.

The driver 10 further includes a microprocessor 24, some nonvolatile memory 26 (ROM, EPROM, EEPROM), some volatile memory 28 (RAM) and an I/O interface 34 (such as

30   SCSI) through which the drive 10 is connected to the host computer 14. In a typical read/write drive for an optical memory card the microprocessor 24 sends and receives commands to and from the host computer 14. The microprocessor 24's firmware is stored on the nonvolatile

35   memory 26. The firmware is code that allows the microprocessor to interpret the commands and to direct the modulation of the laser optics 18 to read or write appropriate information on the card 12. These drive

elements 24-34 are common to both insecure passive media
drives and the secure drives 10 of the present invention.
The secure drives have additional security features,
including a cryptographic processor 30 and sensors 32
5   that protect the drive 10 against intruders. The key or
keys that the drive uses encrypt or decrypt security
information on the optical memory card 12 (secret keys,
digital signatures, etc.), and to encrypt or decrypt
transaction data (messages, commands), are stored in the
10   drive's EEPROM or other non-volatile memory 26. The
drive 10 is made tamper-resistant by taking physical
measures which are known in the art to seal the drive and
thwart attempts to open the drive or otherwise gain
unauthorized access to the keys and other critical
15   information. In particular, the drive 10 is shielded
from attacks that use electromagnetic radiation to peek
inside the unit, e.g. with x-rays, or that monitor signal
radiation emitted by drive circuitry which might
otherwise leak out of the drive. The security sensors 32
20   detect attempts to open the unit, e.g. by cutting. If
such an attack is detected, the unit 10 will erase the
contents of its firmware and all critical information
contained within its memory 26 or 29. It may also
destroy parts of the circuitry by burning some of the
25   components, e.g. cryptographic processor 30. A battery
(not shown) keeps the sensors 32 and critical information
operational in the absence of electricity and is used for
data and component destruction in the event of an attack.
Other physical security measures are also possible.
30   The cryptographic processor 30, in addition to
encrypting and decrypting data written to or read from
the card 12, also provides validation of authorized users
by means of digital signature and certificate protocols,
and further provides encrypting and decrypting of
35   transaction data flowing between the drive 10 and the
host computer 14 over signal lines 36. This scheme turns

the passive storage medium 12 and drive 10 into a
"virtual" smart card system, as seen by the host computer
14.

       With reference to Fig. 2, digital certificates
5   are documents issued in a standard format (e.g., ITU-T
x.509) by a certifying authority (CA) attesting that a
specific public key belongs to a particular individual or
entity. Such certificates typically contain the
authorized user's name and other identifying information,
10   together with an associated public key, an expiration
date, and the name and digital signature of the issuing
certifying authority (CA). Thus, digital certificates
are a form of digital signature of the certifying
authority using its public key that certify public keys
15   from forgery, false representation or alteration,
allowing a receiver of a message (e.g. a transaction
instruction or record) to authenticate the message's
signature. There may be two or more certificates
authenticate a message, forming a hierarchical chain of
20   certificates, in which the authenticity of one
certificate is attested by another issued by a higher
certifying authority. At the top of the certificate
hierarchy is a top-level or "root" certifying authority
(CA-0) (e.g., a government agency) and whose public key
25   is widely published so as to be independently known. The
issuer of the optical memory card or like passive storage
medium, for example, a bank or other financial
institution, an insurance company, an HMO or other health
provider, an employer, university or municipality is
30   typically a level two or three certifying authority (CA-2
or CA-3). Thus, the root CA-0 entity vouches for high-
level CA-1 entities, which in turn vouch for the card
issuing CA-2 entities or for CA-2 entities that vouch for
card issuing CA-3 entities. Different certifying
35   authorities can have access to different drive
operations, including the ability to securely modify
protocols and keys embedded in the drive. Different
certifying authorities could also have access to

different sections or partitions of a storage medium. The most certifying authority CA-0 can give certifying authority to the drives. That is, the certifying authority (CA) certifies the drive, and the drive

5   certifies other processes, including the drive-computer and drive-media communications, using its own certificates. Each drive can issue different types of certificates, depending on the function at the time. Each drive is capable of certifying the data before it is

10   stored on the passive medium, and likewise before it is forwarded to the computer. Because the process of certification requires digital signatures, encryption and the like in accord with selected secure protocols, these capabilities of the drive give the data stored in passive

15   media enhanced security.

With reference to Fig. 3, optical memory cards or other passive storage media are issued by an enrollment process that establishes a user's digital signature for that medium. While a CA might issue certificates to

20   unaffiliated individuals with proper identification, in a typical transaction system in accord with the present invention the card issuing CA would normally issue transaction cards containing such certificates only to their members. Thus, a company would issue cards to its

25   own employees, a university to its faculty and students, an HMO to its doctors and member patients, a bank to its account holders, etc. In a first enrollment step 41, the new user produces a message M_1 containing personal data required by the issuer and selects a password or personal

30   identification number (PIN). The password or PIN is used by the computer to generate cryptographic keys such as an asymmetric (private-public) key pair (A_k, a_k). The card could be issued over a less secure pathway, e.g. remotely over the Internet, by adding certain additional encryption and

35   certification steps according to a secure protocol, such as secure sockets layer (SSL), Hands Like Protocol, developed by Netscape Communications Corp. Even more commonly, secure protocols are always used regardless of

the supposed security of the communication pathway. Any protocol can be used, including the well established SSL protocol. The new user signs the message M_1 with a private key A_k, and the signed message $A_k(M_1)$ is encrypted by a host

5   computer (step 45) with one of the drive's public keys 61 and the user's public key a_k is attached to obtain an envelope $[E_{b1}(A_k(M_1)), a_k]$ that is sent to the certifying authority issuing the card. The key b1 used to form the envelope is a public key of a tamper-resistant drive

10   associated with the issuer. Such drives store corresponding private keys (B1, etc.) which are inaccessible to the user or any unauthorized person. Private keys generated by the drive can be changed only b1 certain authorized parties, e.g. the card issuer or

15   perhaps only to higher certifying authorities (CA-0 or CA-1). The certifying authority signs the envelope with its private key, $E_{CA}[E_{b1}CA_k(M_1), a_k]$ and sends it to the drive (step 47). The issuer's drive then opens the envelope with the certifying authority's public key,

20     $D_{ca}(E_{CA}[E_{b1}(A_k(M_1)), a_k]) = [E_{b1}(A_k(M_1)), a_k]$, (step 49) to extract the public key a_k. The drive accepts this key as valid because it has been certified. The drive then decrypts the signed message $D_{B1}(E_{b1}(A_k(M_1))) = A_k(M_1)$, using one of its private keys B1 (step 51). At this point, the user's

25   public key a_k could be used to extract the required personal information $D_{ak}(A_k(M_1)) = M_1$.) The card issuer drive next encrypts (step 53) the envelope received from the user using another of its public keys b2 and writes the encrypted envelope $[E_{b2}(A_k(M_1)), a_k]$ to a passive storage

30   medium. Such as an optical memory card. The user is now enrolled for subsequent transactions involving the issuer's drives.

      With reference to Fig. 4, in conducting a transaction, an enrolled user presenting a transaction

35   card must verify his identity. The user inserts the card or other passive medium into a drive (step 61), and enters a password or PIN and a "request verification" command message M_2 (step 63). Again, the password or PIN is used

by a cryptographic processor to derive an asymmetric (private-public) key pair A_k, a_k. If the user has entered the correct password or PIN then these keys will match those used in creating the envelope stored on the card.

5   The command message M_2 is signed (step 65) with the private key A_k in the derived pair to create the signed message $A_k(M_2)$.

The user then encrypts (step 67) the signed message with the transaction terminal's public key b1 and

10   sends the encrypted message $E_{b1}(A_k(M_2))$ over a communications pathway to the transaction terminal, which then decrypts (step 69) the received message using a corresponding private key B1 to obtain the signed message, $D_{B1}(E_{b1}(A_k(M_2))) = A_k(M_2)$. Next, the transaction terminal

15   reads (step 71) the personal information that was stored as an envelope on the card during enrollment, $E_{b2}(A_k(M_1), a_k)$. As this signature is already encrypted, further encryption is not needed to transmit the information to the transaction terminal, even if the

20   communications pathway is considered otherwise insecure. The transaction terminal or drive uses its private key B2 to decrypt (step 73) the signature and obtain the user's public key a_k, i.e. $D_{B2}(E_{b2}(A_k(M_1), a_k)) = A_k(M_1), a_k$. This decryption will be successful only if the envelope from

25   the storage medium is valid, such that the terminal drive has a private key B2 corresponding to the public key b2 used to create the envelope during enrollment. The transaction terminal then uses this user public key a_k obtained from the card to decrypt (step 75) the signed

30   message, $D_{ak}(A_k(M_2)) = M_2$. When the public key obtained from the decrypted envelope read from the card corresponds to the private key derived from the user-entered PIN that was used to sign the message M_2, the decryption will be successful and the transaction terminal will be assured

35   that the user is valid. The transaction terminal fulfills the user's request command by then decrypting (step 77) the user's original message, M_1, stored in the digital signature on the card, $D_{ak}(A_k(M_1)) = M_1$, thereby revealing

the user account information that enables a transaction to be conducted. The transaction terminal transmits this information to the host computer for validation of the transaction request by first encrypting (step 79) an

5 envelope containing the signed message $A_k(M_1)$ and public key a_k from its with one of its private keys B1. The encrypted message $E_{B1}(A_k(M_1),a_k)$ is decrypted (step 81) by the user with the corresponding public key of the transaction terminal, $D_{b1}(E_{B1}(A_k(M_1),a_k)) = A_k(M_1),a_k$, when

10 then validates the transaction request.

The encryption, digital signatures, certificates of any data by the host (computer, network, etc.) allows only a secure transmission to the drive, and vice versa when the drive encrypts and signs any data. That data is

15 then re-encrypted with a combination of original keys and unique (new) keys generated by and inside the drive before they are stored on the media. In other words, the encrypted data, digitally signed and certified, does not externally resemble the same data as it was sent by a

20 computer to the drive. The fundamental reasons for those separate processes are (a) to prevent any monitoring of communications between computer and drive from shedding any light on what is being stored on the media, (b) to establish, by a kind of "remapping", a relationship

25 between the drive and media that is unique and different from the relationship between the host computer and the drive, and (c) to prevent anyone trying to make an exact bit copy of the media from knowing what data is being stored and how that data is being stored.

30 Occasionally, there will be a need to either add, delete or change keys inside the drive. Protocols could also be changed. The root authority CA-0 or a top-level authority CA-1 higher than the issuing authority CA-2 or CA-3 associated with the particular drive can certify

35 the new keys. With reference to Fig. 5, a message M_3 containing the new keys (starting point 91 in Fig. 5) and commands directing the change or addition of keys, is signed by the certifying authority (CA), as seen in step

93, $CA_k(M_3)$. This is done using CA's private key CA_k. The
CA creates a digital envelope (step 95), encrypting the
signed message with a public key of the drive whose key's
are being changed or added to and sends the envelope,

5   $E_{B1}(CA_k(M_3))$ to that drive. The drive decrypts (step 97)
the envelope, $D_{b1}(E_{B1}(CA_k(M_3))) = CA_k(M_3)$, and then decrypts
(step 99) the signed message with the CA's public key ca_k,
$D_{cak}(CA_k(M_3)) = M_3$. The certified new keys are added (or
replace some or all, old keys) in the drive's secure

10 EEPROM (step 101).

        With reference to Fig. 6, if a user wants to
store very sensitive information on the passive storage
medium, such as transaction account information relating
to the user, so that it will be accepted as valid on

15 feature reads by a drive or host computer, then it meets
not only to be encrypted but also certified. The data is
in the form of a message M_4, which is encrypted (step 111)
by the user with a symmetric key S_A to produce the envelope
$S_A(M_4)$. A certifying authority then signs the envelope

20 (step 113) the envelope with the certifying authority's
public key, $D_{cak}(E_{CAk}[S_A(M_4)]) = S_A(M_4)$, and then encrypts
(step 117) the user's signed message with another of its
private keys, $E_{B2}(S_A(M_4))$ and unites it (step 119) to the
storage medium.

25   These examples of preferred digital signature
protocols using digital certificates show how a passive
storage medium can be used in secure transactions when
used with tamper resistant drives containing cryptographic
processors. Other protocols, such as SSL, could be used

30 as well. The media store encrypted transaction data and a
encrypted digital certificate containing a user encrypted
digital signature. Access to drive encryption keys are
restricted, while allowing drive operation by authorized
persons presenting a valid storage medium with a user

35 keyword or PIN. The digital certificate must be renewed
periodically, as it contains an expiration date as part of
the message or envelope. (Certificates might also be
revised prior to their scheduled expiration date by using

protocols involving certificate revokation lists (CRLs)
listing current certificates.) Transaction data
communication between the drive and a host computer is
also encrypted using either public key or, preferably,

5   secret key (symmetric) encryption so that there are no
weak links in the system through which transaction or
encryption key data might otherwise become open to
unauthorized inspection. Hence, secure transactions with
passive media are now possible.